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I.

INTRODUCTION

While the religion clauses of the First Amendment have been
the subject of renewed attention in recent years,' the Supreme
Court has yet to articulate anything resembling a comprehensive
theory of free exercise. 2 Much of the Court's free exercise jurisprudence has focused upon the issue of exemptions from generally
applicable statutes for religiously motivated conduct or for religious ritual.3 The enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 has reinforced this focus.4 I shall suggest that this focus has inappropriately cast the debate over free exercise in terms
of individual rights. The appropriate focus should be upon neither
individuals nor rights, but upon religious groups and their
autonomy.5
The important role of religious institutions in society has been
increasingly recognized by scholars.6 I will suggest that it makes
sense to see the Free Exercise Clause as primarily concerned with
the ability of religious groups to command the loyalty of their ad* Eugene N. Balk Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of
Law. Research support for the article was provided by an endowment funded by Eugene N. Balk and The Anderson Group.
1 See generally Lucy Salsbury Payne, Uncovering the FirstAmendment: A Research Guide
to the Religion Clauses, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 825 (1990).
2 See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of FreeExerciseJurisprudence,60
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 782 (1992).
3 See Developments In the Law-Religion and State, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1606, 1703-40
(1987); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591 (1990).
4 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
5 See Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative,97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 26-35
(1983); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAw § 14-1 (2d ed. 1988);
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward A ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof Religious Group Rights,
1989 Wis. L. REv. 99; Timothy L. Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free
Exercise, 67 TUL. L. REv. 87, 125-33 (1992) ("The liberal political tradition has always
been on uneasy terms with groups.") (citation omitted); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CuI.
TURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERJCAN LAw AND

POLITICS

TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION

34-35, 141-52 (1993).
6 See Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, StructuralFree Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REv.
477 (1991).
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herents through a system of beliefs and practices. The world of
religion known to the drafters of the Constitution and experienced
almost universally in the present day is the world of more-or-less
organized religion. This is not to denigrate concerns over protection of individual conscience. Most religious claims of conscience
are connected to the belief systems of organized religious groups.7
In the rare cases in which "religious" claims' are raised outside the
context of the tenets of a religious group, the free expression provisions of the First Amendment adequately, and more appropriately, can be used for the protection of such individual rights. 9
The drafters of the Bill of Rights had neither the time nor the
inclination to develop a comprehensive theory of human freedom.
The inclusion of the Ninth Amendment was the drafters' way of
pointing this out.1 ° The drafters were responding to particularized
concerns articulated in the process of constitutional ratification by
a number of states.'1 Thus we should not be surprised that their
product reflected only a partial catalogue of basic values, focused
upon those issues which were contemporaneously most pressing.
The protection of religious groups and their adherents was the
pressing issue to which the religion clauses were directed. 2
Modern communitarian writers appear to have rediscovered
principles that seemed implicit to some groups of eighteenth-century Americans. Today's communitarians assert that "the community of which an individual is a member is constitutive of that
individual's identity and not merely contingent or accidental to

7 The Supreme Court has sometimes largely ignored the communal nature of
religious beliefs and described communal beliefs largely in individual terms. See, e.g.,
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). The trial court's findings of fact in Roy make it
clear that the religious beliefs involved were those of groups of Native Americans.
Roy v. Cohen, 590 F. Supp. 600, 604-05 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
8 See generally Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CAL.
L. REv. 753 (1984).
9 See William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression,
67 MINN. L. REv. 545 (1983); CARTER, supra note 5, at 129-30; cf.Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L.
Rxv. 1409, 1490 (1990) (use of term "religion" rather than "conscience" in First
Amendment encompasses the corporate or institutional aspects of religion).
10 See Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L.

REv. 223 (1983).
11 See generally EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BIL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY

10-33 (1957).
12 See generally Edwin S. Gaustad, Colonial Religion and Liberty of Conscience, in THE
VIRGIIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 23 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C.
Vaughan eds., 1988).
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it."13 In the eighteenth century, however, battles raged between
the universalism and the particularism of the constitutive community. Some eighteenth century Americans would have identified
with modern communitarians who argue that
the value of universal truth is as uncertain when seen from inside a particular community as is the value of pluralism when
seen from outside every particular community ....

But from

their standpoint, it will not always be obvious that the rights, say,
of abstract men and women, the inhabitants of some ideal commonwealth, ought to be enforced here and now.... [I]t will
involve overriding their own traditions, conventions, and expectations. These are, of course, readily accessible to philosophical
criticism; they were not "designed at will in an orderly fashion"
by a founder or a sage; they are the result of historical negotiation, intrigue, and struggle. But that is just the point. The products of a shared experience, they are valued by the people over
the philosopher's gifts because they belong to the people and
the gifts do not ....

14

In the context of the First Amendment's religion clauses, the battle was one between the Enlightenment universalism of Thomas Jefferson and the religious particularism of Roger Williams. 5 The
Supreme Court has chosen the Jeffersonian model.1 6 In so doing, it
has de-emphasized the role of religious groups, and created as the
measure of free exercise the extent to which the commands of individual conscience may be vindicated. 7 This emphasis upon individual
conscience has often made free exercise cases indistinguishable from
free expression cases. 18 I will suggest that a coherent understanding
of the special role of the Free Exercise Clause will not be possible
until the clause is understood as a protector of the autonomy of religious subgroups.
This reinterpretation of the Free Exercise Clause will not, of
13

Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90

MICH.

L.

REv. 685, 692 (1992).
Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379, 394-95 (1981).
See MARK DEWOLFE HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTrrtriONAL HISTORY 5-6 (1965); Philip B. Kurland,
The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 839, 859
(1986).
16 HowE, supra note 15, at 1-12; David Little, Thomas Jefferson's Religious Views and
Their Influence on the Supreme Court's Interpretationof the FirstAmendment, 26 CATH. U. L.
14
15

REv. 57 (1976).
17 See McConnell, supra note 9, at 1488-1500.
18 See, e.g, Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640
(1981); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

19941

RETHINKING FREE EXERCISE

1803

course, eliminate difficult questions of balancing. But instead of balancing between the strength of the general governmental interest in
regulation and the particularist interest in religiously motivated conduct, the search will be directed at more meaningful-and probably
more difficult-questions. The search will be directed toward the
question of how to take religions seriously as systems designed to effectively represent, explain, and control one's environment,1 9 and yet
avoid the political balkanization that has often accompanied the existence of strong competing and autonomous religious systems. When
the governmental interest is defined as strengthening rather than
splintering the societal fabric, the occasions upon which governmental interference with religiously motivated conduct or religious ritual
is permitted will be more easily identifiable.
II.

SANTERIA:

A CASE IN POINT

In June 1993, the United States Supreme Court decided
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. ° On First
Amendment grounds, the Court unanimously invalidated legislation which outlawed the ritual sacrifice of animals practiced by adherents of the Santeria religion. However, neither the majority
opinion, nor any of the three concurring opinions, fundamentally
advanced free exercise jurisprudence beyond the debate which has
raged since the Court's 1990 Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith21 decision changed the test to be applied
to claims for religiously-based exemptions from generally applicable statutes. 22 In Smith, the Court held that burdens upon religious
practices need not be justified by a compelling state interest if the
burden results from a neutral statute of general applicability. 23 Because, however, the Court found that the city ordinances in Lukumi
were not neutral or of general applicability, but in fact targeted
Santeria sacrifices, a strict scrutiny test, which could not be met,
was to be applied even under Smith. 4
The Santeria religion developed in Cuba among the Yorubas
of Africa who were brought to Cuba to work in the sugar industry.
19 See E. THOMAs LAWSON & ROBERT N. McCAULEY, RETHINKING RELIGION: CONNECTING COGNITION AND CULTURE 33-41 (1990).
20

113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).

21 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
22 SeeJames E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. Ruv. 1407 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109 (1990).
23 494 U.S. at 878-89.
24 113 S. Ct. at 2225-34.
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It spread to the United States, particularly to New York and Florida, by Cuban exiles fleeing the Castro revolution. Santeria is an
adaptation of African worship to the surrounding religious culture
of Cuba. It uses Catholic symbols to worship Yoruba spirits called
orishas. Santeria adherents can understand and fulfill their preordained destinies when they develop a deep personal relationship
with the orishas. Santeria aims at the development of a relationship between an adherent and his orisha that will provide the adherent with his basic orientation in life. The religion provides
insight into solutions of mundane daily problems through various
ceremonial routes that deepen the adherent's relationship with the
orishas. An important means of developing this relationship is the
symbolic sharing of food with the orishas through ritual sacrifice of
special foods. Sacrifices take place at important life cycle events as
well as at an annual celebration. Sacrifice creates a symbiotic relationship between the orisha and the adherent, because sacrifice is
necessary for the orisha's survival. Sacrifices may take the form of
cakes or fruits, or may at times be animals slaughtered ritually and
eaten by the Santeria congregation as part of the orisha's feast.2 5
While the majority's opinion in Lukumi begins by suggesting
the rich tradition of Santeria and its important role in the life of its
adherents, 26 the Court quickly proceeds to marginalize and denigrate Santeria ritual. As with most free exercise cases, the Court at
a fundamental level fails to treat the religious tradition at issue seriously or with intellectual respect.27 In beginning his discussion of
the constitutional rule to be applied, Justice Kennedy remarks as
follows:
Although the practice of animal sacrifice may seem abhorrent to
some, "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection."... Given the historical association between animal sacrifice and religious worship .. .petitioners' assertion that animal sacrifice is an integral part
of their religion
"cannot be deemed bizarre or incredible." 28
As both Justice Souter2 9' and Justice Blackmun" point out in their
25 13 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 66-67 (Mircea Eliade ed. 1987). See also
Lukum, 113 S. Ct. at 2222-23.
26 113 S. Ct. at 2222-23.
27 See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
115, 120 (1992) (Warren and Burger Courts "view[ed] religion as an unreasoned, ag-

gressive, exclusionary, and divisive force"). See generally CARTER, supra note 5.
28
29
30

Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2225-26 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 2250 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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concurring opinions, the Court in Lukumi was able to avoid the more
difficult question of whether the Smith approach should be reaffirmed
when a statute is neutral and of general applicability. As Justice Blackmun phrased it: "A harder case would be presented if petitioners
were requesting an exemption from a generally applicable anticruelty
law.""1 Both the Souter and Blackmun opinions urge a return to the
pre-Smith law in such cases. However, even that return, which the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 199332 now mandates, does not assure that the Court would strike down a general anticruelty law. The
problem is how one balances the interests at stake. Justice Blackmun's
tentative approach to the issue illustrates the problem:
This case does not present, and therefore I decline to reach, the
question whether the Free Exercise Clause would require a religious exemption from a law that sincerely pursued the goal of
protecting animals from cruel treatment. The number of organizations that have filed amicus briefs on behalf of this interest,
however, demonstrates that it is not a concern to be lightly
treated.3 3
If the counting of amici can be seriously suggested as even a starting point for the application of a compelling interest standard, the
complaint of commentators that the Court has developed no meaningful or comparable way to measure the interests of either religion or
government must be taken seriously.3 " This article is an attempt to
suggest starting points for developing meaningful measures.
III.

UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

Opposing interests cannot be balanced unless the weight of
each is assessed. However, in many free exercise cases the Court
essentially ignores the importance of the religious interest involved 5 and concentrates solely on the weight of the government's
36
interest in the regulation it has imposed. Goldman v. Weinberger
provides a classic example of this theory. Nowhere injustice Rehnquist's majority opinion, which upheld military regulations that
prevented an Orthodox Jewish serviceman from wearing a yarId. at 2251 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). See Douglas Laycock, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 221; Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and JudicialReview, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 73.
33 Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2251-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
34 West, supra note 3, at 606; see also Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 50
REv. POL. 628, 631 (1988).
35 See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J.
1611 (1993).
36 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
31
32
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mulke, was the importance of the religious practice involved even
mentioned.3 7 In reading the Court's opinions in most free exercise cases, one comes away with the distinct impression that the
Court generally sees religious groups in the same way it sees grand
juries-as institutions protected because their historical importance enshrined them in the Constitution, not as institutions that
have inherent present-day value."8 Until the Court evinces an understanding of the contemporary value of religious institutions, its
attempts to delineate the scope of the Free Exercise Clause will
continue to founder.
The drafters of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights had a
rather different view of religious groups than today's Court. Religious groups were, and are, part of what has been accurately described as "the crisscrossing networks of associations and
relationships that constitute the warp and woof of civil society."3 9
True, Madison in the Federalist Papers saw religious factions, along
with other factions, as the cause of
[c]omplaints... that our governments are'too unstable, that the
public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and
that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules
of justice and the rights of the minor party, but 4by
the superior
0
force of an interested and overbearing majority.
But even Madison conceded that " [d] ifferent interests necessarily exist
in different classes of citizens."4" Thus, the issue was how to create
government that promoted the common good in light of the differing
interests of various political and religious factions.
Destruction of factions, while a theoretical possibility, was to
Madison a "folly," because any attempt to do so would also destroy
"liberty, which is essential to political life."4" Madison argued that
37 Congress invalidated military regulations which prohibited the wearing of a yarmulke by the enactment of P.L. 100-180, 101 Stat. 1019, 1086-87 (1987) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 774 (Supp. 1988)).
38 This view of the grand jury is evidenced by the Supreme Court's refusal to selectively incorporate into the Fourteenth Amendment and apply to the states the grand
jury provisions of the Fifth Amendment. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 333-34 (4th ed.
1991). For a modern example of this judicial attitude toward grand juries, see Rivera
v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 375 F.2d 988 (3d Cir. 1967). However, for the
position that the grand jury was intended to be a central component of a system of
democratic self-government, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
39 Glendon & Yanes, supra note 6, at 546.
40 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
41 THE FEDERALIsT No. 51 (James Madison).

42 THE FEDERALIST

No. 10 (James Madison).
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there are only two methods of guarding against the injustice that
could result from the power of one interest group to oppress another.
One is to create "a will in the community independent of the majority-that is, of the society itself; the other [is] by comprehending in the
society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not
impracticable." 4 3 Madison, of course, opted for the latter solution.
Modern constitutional scholarship has focused upon the conflict
between liberalism and republicanism-between a conception of society in which law attempts to deal with atomistic individualism, 4 and a
conception in which universal civic values motivate political actors.45
Proper interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause calls for a third alternative: a focus upon maintaining the autonomy of "intermediate
associations." 46 It calls for emphasizing the reverse side of Madison's
concern over factions-the side he took for granted. It calls for taking seriously the importance of subgroups and private associations
within society as sources of values 47 and, perhaps more importanly
from the point of view of governmental policy-makers, as alternative
sources of control over conduct of individuals who are members of
the subgroups. 48 It calls for restoring what Professor Glendon has
49
called "the missing dimension of sociality."

The Bill of Rights was not the product of an exhaustive formulation of political theory. It was rather a response to the most pressing
concerns of those living in the late eighteenth century. Professor
Amir has identified three intermediate institutions which the drafters
of the Bill of Rights were particularly concerned with protecting-militias, juries, and churches.5" Of course they were protected in different ways because of the different threats to which they had been
historically exposed. Even before the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
the drafters of the Constitution had recognized individual states as
separate social units whose autonomy required elaborate protection.
The ultimate compromise on slavery embodied in the Constitution
was a particularly painful acknowledgment of the tension between the
43 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
44 See Thomas L. Pangle, The Classical Challenge to the American

Constitution,66

CHI.-

KENT L. REv. 145, 166-71 (1990).
45 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
46 Amar, supra note 38, at 1132; CARTER, supra note 5, at 37.
47 MICHAEL PERRY, MORALMIY, POLITICS AND LAw 30-33 (1988);

1539 (1988).
Gedicks, supra note

5, at 161-62; Hall, supra note 5, at 123.
48 See Tushnet, supra note 34, at 645.
49 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALc

THE IMPOVERISHMENT

OF

POLITICAL Dis-

COURSE 109 (1991). See also Martha Minow, Pluralisms,21 CONN. L. REV. 965 (1989).
50 Amar, supra note 38, at 1132.
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importance of autonomy and that which many perceived as the demands of a higher law.5" That the drafters of the Bill of Rights did not
specifically include protections for families and neighborhoods, for
example, 52 does not mean that these were unimportant subgroups. It
only means that they had not been subject to significant attack in the
late eighteenth century, and their protection was therefore not high
on the agenda of pragmatic politicians who needed to fashion a document that could win approval of the requisite supermajority called for
in order to amend the basic law of the land.5" Thus, in interpreting
the Free Exercise Clause, one must consider not only that religious
groups are but one example of a subgroup whose protection is vital to
a well-functioning society, but also that the historical context in which
the Bill of Rights was drafted resulted in special concern for religious
groups.
Modem free exercise cases have often forgotten the value to society of supporting the viability of religious subgroups. While the
Supreme Court has been willing to support the autonomy of religious
organizations in establishing their own rules of governance and adjudicating their own disputes over church doctrine,5 4 it has not focused
upon autonomy concerns when general rules of law threaten to
weaken the loyalty of adherents to the tenets of a religious organization. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association5 5 involved
the challenge by various Northwest California Indian groups to the
construction of a paved road through a portion of a national forest
that had historically been used by the Indians for religious purposes.
In rejecting the Indians' claims, the Supreme Court stated:
Even if we assume that we should accept the Ninth Circuit's
prediction, according to which the G-O road will "virtually destroy the... Indians' ability to practice their religion," . . . the

Constitution simply does not provide a principle that could justify upholding respondents' legal claims. However much we
might wish that it were otherwise, government simply could not
operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious
needs and desires.5 6
Thus the slippery slope becomes the excuse for refusing to even try to
51

See

PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFEcr UNION:

SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMrIY

22-30 (1981).
52

See GLENDON, supra note 49, at 109.

53 Cf Hall, supra note 5, at 114 (religion was protected "not because it was neces-

sarily distinctively valuable, but because it was valuable and distinctively vulnerable').
54 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
55 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
56 Id. at 451-52 (citation omitted).
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vindicate the autonomy of critically important societal components in
the face of governmental undermining of adherent loyalty.
Why has the Court been so obtuse in failing to recognize as more
serious the destruction of religious traditions? I would suggest it
stems from the Court's embrace of Jeffersonian Republicanism. In its
seminal cases interpreting the religion clauses of the Constitution, the
Court relied upon the separationist writings of Jefferson.5 7 It is less
clear whether the Court understood the implications of the Jeffersonian approach. Jefferson's view of religion, as well as Jefferson's view
of government, stands in opposition to the strengthening of religious
subgroups as building blocks of the social order. For Jefferson, religion was intensely personal and private.5" While he maintained formal church membership, it is clear that he felt little if any attachment
to formal church doctrine.5 9 Rather, for classical republicans such as
Jefferson,
the community and the government were joined in a common
endeavor of promoting individual and civil virtue. Law and morality were necessarily intertwined. Thus no part of individual
life could be marked off as separate from the community, and
no part of communal life was beyond the reach of the government acting on behalf of the community. 0
It is, of course, misleading to describe American society as if it
were solely a collection of insular factions holding each other at bay.
A strong strand of civic republicanism, of a shared civil religion, binds
together much of American society.6 1 Martin Marty has described the
origins of this shared civil religion that was embodied in the DeistHumanist traditions of Enlightenment thought:
Proponents of the deist-humanist school argue... that a society
cannot cohere without some more or less spiritual core, some
minimal consensus juris, some common religious faith that ad57 SeeBraunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 12-13 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
58 CHARLES B. SANFORD, THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 12-14 (1984).
59 Id. at 4-5; HENRY WILDER FooTE, THE RELIGION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 9 (1947).
Jefferson once stated: "I never submitted the whole system of my opinions to the
creed of any party of men whatever, in religion, in philosophy, in politics or in anything else, where I was capable of thinking for myself." Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Francis Hopkinson (March 13, 1789) reprinted in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRrTNGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 459, 460 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).
60 Suzanna Sherry, The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution: A Lawyers' Guide To
Contemporary Historical Scholarship, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 323, 343 (1988).
61 See ROBERT N. BELLA-I, Civil Religion in America, in BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON
RELIGION IN A POsT-TRADITONAL WORLD 168-89 (1970); ROBERT N. BELLAH & PHILLIP
E. HAMMOND, VARIETIES OF CIVIL RELIGION (1980); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and
Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 197-201 (1992).
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mits of great
variety and permits dissent, but still provides a
62
framework.
That civic republican bond, while broad, is also shallow. It is not
the fighting faith of religious fundamentalists, and does not demand
the loyalty of its adherents in so intense a way as do more particularistic religious systems. It resembles the notion of civil religion described in the eighteenth century by Rousseau; one in which the
dogmas are "simple, few in number, stated with precision, without explanation or commentaries" and where the primary prohibition is
intolerance.63
When loyalties of a more intense sort to the values of a discrete
subgroup are lost, the shared civil religion attempts to operate as a
moral safety net to maintain a minimal level of civility in the social
order. But the attraction of the rather bland civil religion is weak, and
to rely upon it alone to overcome the forces of individualism and selfinterest has proven to be unrealistic.
The broad ties of civil religion are, however, not merely a residual
source of values for the unchurched. They are also the bonds to
which even members of highly structured subgroups look in their relationships with outsiders.' These ties are "a way for Americans to interpret their collective experience, their relationship with God and
with one another in terms of religious faith."6 5 The civil religion is, in
short, the bond that prevents balkanization of American society. Of
course, in order to function in this role, the demands of the civil religion must be minimal. Those demands are reflected in the civil law to
which all are held. At the same time, the hallmark of civil religion is
its universality. It may not adopt as its own the ceremonies or rites of
a religious subgroup,66 but must use secular means to further its
goals.6 7 When a law lacks this general applicability, its unifying force
is undercut. Thus, whatever else may be said of its recent free exercise
holdings, the Supreme Court is correct in identifying as particularly
62 Martin E. Marty, The Virginia Statute Two Hundred Years Later, in THE VIRGINIA

FOR RELIGIous FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 1, 15.
63 JEAN-JACQUES ROuSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Book IV, chap. viii) 131

STATUTE

(Roger D. Masters ed., 1978).
64 See WILLIAM PETERSEN ET AL., CONCEPTS OF ETHNicrrv 137-43 (1982).
65 Thomas E. Buckley, The Political Theology of Thomas Jefferson, in THE VIRGINIA
STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,

supra note 12, at 75, 77.

66 See Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv.
299, 306 ("The quid pro quo for the extraordinary shelter of the free exercise clause is
the balancing guaranty that the secular government created by the Constitution will
remain secular.").
67 See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 281 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).

19941

RETHINKING FREE EXERCISE

1811

suspect those laws which impinge upon religious subgroups without
creating a universally applicable alternative rule.6"
It is the presence of this mixed form of social organization-discrete subgroups demanding intense loyalties coupled with a broader
but more shallow civil religion-which is both the blessing and the
curse. The same tension between the particularistic and the universal
which permits American society to foster pluralism without totally losing its cohesion makes interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause difficult and imprecise. Free exercise claims arise essentially when some
perceive the demands of civil religion to have extended too far so that
they threaten the continued viability of a religious subgroup. 69 At
what cost should subgroup autonomy be maintained?
"Compelling interest" is the shorthand which the courts have
used to identify the situations in which the price of maintaining subgroup autonomy becomes excessively high. The autonomy claimed by
a religious subgroup may not deserve protection in two situations.
First, the claimed autonomy should yield if its maintenance threatens
to excessively balkanize American society. In terms more familiar to
American constitutional jurisprudence, the First Amendment should
not countenance the creation of political divisions along religious
lines. While this concept has generally been used only in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,7 ° I shall suggest that it also has a fitting
place in solving the free exercise dilemma. The second situation in
which the cost of subgroup autonomy may be excessive arises when
vindication of the free exercise claim may so dilute the force of the
shared civil religion that even its minimal claim to universal loyalty is
threatened.
The fragmentation of society along religious lines has posed a
severe problem in many parts of the world.7 1 Whether it be the Middle East, Northern Ireland, or Bosnia, loyalties to subgroups defined
along religious lines have often paralyzed the operation of the
broader society. In the United States, that type of social fragmentation has largely not occurred along religious lines; instead it has taken
the form of racial conflict. Political fragmentation along racial lines is
68 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78
(1990); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2226 (1993).
69 See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me out": Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L. REv. 581 (1993).
70 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.ll (1983); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794-98 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971).
71 Cf Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism,and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 615 (1991).
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well known. The development of equal protection jurisprudence has
taken account of this.7 2 Attempts to similarly politicize religion have
been rare, and where they have occurred, those attempts have been
soundly rejected. Thus, the claim by the Hassidic Jewish community
of Williamsburgh in Kings County, New York to cohesive representation in the state legislature were rejected without suggestion that the
claim had any greater validity than those of other neighborhoods
whose bonds were non-religious and were divided in the reapportionment process. 7 3 Any claim that the Free Exercise Clause entitled religious groups to cohesive political representation in the legislature
would be the type of claim that would threaten to excessively balkanize society along religious lines.
In Bob Jones University v. United States,7 4 petitioners did make a free
exercise claim that threatened to excessively fragment the American
body politic along religious lines. The sponsors of Bob Jones University interpreted the Bible as prohibiting interracial dating and interracial marriage. The University denied admission to students who were
involved in an interracial marriage or who advocated interracial marriage or dating, and expelled any students who advocated or practiced
interracial dating or marriage after their admission. 75 Thus, the University allied religious belief with the major fault line in American society. The University claimed that the Internal Revenue Service could
not constitutionally deny tax exempt status to a private school on the
grounds that the school engaged in racial discrimination when that
discrimination was based upon sincerely held religious beliefs. The
Supreme Court had little difficulty in finding that the overriding governmental interest in eradicating racial discrimination took precedence over the claim of religious belief. 76 Any other result would have
imbued racial division with religious passions to an intolerable extent.
A demand of the general civil religion may also be seen as compelling when granting a free exercise exemption would so dilute the
force of the civil religion that loyalty to it would be threatened. This
72

An example of this is Justice O'Connor's formulation of the test to be used in

determining the constitutionality of minority set-asides in City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Justice O'Connor determined that: "Absent searchingjudicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply

no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." Id. at 493.
73 United Jewish Orgs. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 521 (2d Cir. 1975), affd, 430 U.S.
144 (1977).
74

461 U.S. 574 (1983).

75

Id. at 580-81.

76

Id. at 602-04.
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might occur when a selective exemption from the civil law would create intense jealousy or would seriously undermine the moral force of
the general requirement. Arguably this explains the holding in United
States v. Lee." Edwin Lee, who operated a farm and carpentry shop,
was a member of the Amish faith. On religious grounds, he refused to
withhold social security taxes from the pay of his employees, file quarterly social security tax returns, or pay the employer's share of social
security taxes, Lee argued that he should be exempted from these
requirements. The Supreme Court rejected his free exercise claim,
finding that mandatory participation in the social security system is
critical to the system's fiscal soundness. A desire to be excused from
the payment of taxes is certainly more widespread than a desire to
sacrifice animals or wear a head covering in the military or keep one's
place of business open on Sunday rather than Saturday. Excusal of
taxes on grounds which many find difficult to understand may encourage a perception of the tax system as unfair and operate to justify
tax evasion in the minds of many. It may lead to a perception of illegitimacy as to the underlying civil rule which is not present in most
situations when a religious exemption is carved out of a generally applicable statute.
Critical to the complex pluralism of American society is the voluntary nature of its particularistic subgroups. The ability of an individual to terminate both membership in and loyalty to a specific
subgroup in favor of another group, or in favor of residual membership in the general civil religion of the broad society, has important
consequences. 78 First, this voluntariness supports subgroup autonomy. The inability of a group to exert coercive force on its members
eliminates many of the excuses that might otherwise be present for
governmental control of subgroup policies. Second, voluntariness lessens the insularity of the subgroup. Those who have left often maintain some contact with those who remain members of the subgroup.
Also, the threat of loss of membership impels most subgroups to open
themselves to new adherents or members in order to compensate for
those losses. This in turn means that subgroups must retain contact
with those outside their ranks in order to attract them to membership.
These intergroup contacts facilitate pacific intergroup relationships
and adjustments of subgroups to the civil law backdrop against which
they exist.
To the extent that free exercise claims involve attempts to limit
the escape of members of religious groups from the authority of the
77 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
78

See Gedicks, supra note 5, at 161.
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groups, those claims may be particularly suspect because they serve to
create a kind of unhealthy insularity for the subgroups. The courts
should be particularly unsympathetic to free exercise claims that have
the effect of preventing termination of membership in religious
groups.7 9 Indeed, even so strong an advocate of religious freedom as
Justice Douglas drew the line here. In Wisconsin v. Yoder s the Justice
dissented in part from the majority's reversal of the conviction of
Amish parents for refusing to send their children to school beyond
the eighth grade. Justice Douglas insisted that the Court should first
determine whether any of the children wished to attend high school
in anticipation of possibly leaving the Amish community."1
IV.

UNDERSTANDING

THE CRITICAL ROLE OF RELIGIOUS RITUAL

While a reshaped approach to free exercise must involve a focus upon the communal nature of religious faith, the Supreme
Court must reshape its approaches to free exercise even more fundamentally. In examining the interest protected by the First
Amendment, two separate issues have often become intertwined,
or at least have been mutually ignored. The first, discussed above,
is the importance of supporting the autonomy of a religious group
threatened by governmental regulation; the second, to which we
now move, is the extent to which a particular ritual or religious
practice which government is attempting to regulate is critical to
the integrity of the religious group involved.
While, at first, ritual may seem unrelated to the communitarian issues discussed above, upon reflection we find a close connection. The ability of subgroups, including religious groups, to retain
a more intense loyalty than does the more general social order is
the feature that permits those subgroups to act more effectively
than the background civil structure to regulate social conduct.12 It
is the efficacy of religious subgroups in strengthening the social
order that is at the heart of the special protection given to them.
Perhaps nothing has been misunderstood as fundamentally by
the Supreme Court as religious ritual. Again, the origins of the
misunderstanding stem from the acceptance of Jeffersonian no79 See Richard Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the
First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1977).
80 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

Id. at 241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
For an example of this type of extreme subgroup loyalty in another context, see
Janice Castro, In the Brutal World of L.A. 's Toughest Gangs; Leon Bing spentfour years with
the Crips and the Bloods to find out why thousands of American teenagers are waging war on
one another in the desolate heart of the City of Dreams, TIME, March 16, 1992, at 12.
81
82
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tions of religion. In the Enlightenment tradition, Jefferson made
sharp distinctions between belief and conduct. The preamble to
the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom drafted by Jefferson in
1777 and adopted by the Virginia General Assembly in 1786 reflected this dichotomy, stating:
that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the
field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation
of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous
fallacy which at once destroys all religious liberty, because he
being of course judge of that tendency will make his opinions
the rule ofjudgment, and approve or condemn the sentiments
of others only as they shall square with or differ from his own;
that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles
break out into
83
overt acts against peace and good order.
In its earliest encounter with the question of religiously motivated
conduct-polygamy-in Reynolds v. United States, 4 the Supreme Court
quoted these provisions of the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom
as well as Jefferson's interpretation of the First Amendment in his
1802 Reply to the Danbury Baptist Association,85 drawing a sharp distinction between belief and conduct. This distinction was maintained
by the Court in many later cases and often gave religious ritual even
less protection than the Court has accorded to non-religious symbolic
expression.8 6
What is often forgotten about the Reynolds decision, however, is
that it began its discussion of the constitutional issues with a passage
that did not turn on this broad distinction between belief and conduct
at all, but instead upon a rather straight forward argument regarding
the specific intent of the drafters of the First Amendment. Chief Justice Waite wrote:
By the statute of 1 James I .... the offence [of polygamy], if
committed in England or Wales, was made punishable in the
civil courts and the penalty was death. As this statute was limited
in its operation to England and Wales, it was at a very early pe83

The Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, reprintedin THE VIRGINIA

STATUTE

FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY

xvii, xviii (1988).
84 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
85 Reply of Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association, January 1, 1802,
reprinted in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332 (Adrienne
Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).
86 For a discussion of the Court's treatment of symbolic expression, see Howard M.
Friedman, Why Do You Speak That Way?--Symbolic Expression Reconsidered, 15 HASTINGS
CoNT. L.Q. 587 (1988).
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riod re-enacted, generally with some modifications, in all the
colonies ....
[I]t is a significant fact that on the 8th of December, 1788, after the passage of the act establishing religious freedom, and after the convention of Virginia had recommended as
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States the declaration in a bill of rights that 'all men have an equal, natural,
and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according
to the dictates of conscience,' the legislature of that State substantially enacted the statute ofJames I, death penalty included
.... From that day to this.., there never has been a time in any
State of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence
against society .... In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most
important feature of social life.8 7
Had the Court ended here, future development of free exercise principles might have been easier. Unfortunately, however, the Court
continued on a different path.
Instead of contenting himself with a simple argument regarding
original intent,8 ChiefJustice Waite insisted on developing the beliefconduct distinction:
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices....
[A]s a law of the organization of society . .. it is provided
that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse
his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief?. To
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government
89
could exist only in name under such circumstances.
It is exactly this language, 112 years later, that Justice Scalia relies
upon in Employment Division v. Smith9 ° to hold that the government
need not demonstrate a compelling interest in order to apply a neutral, generally applicable statute to religiously motivated action. Focusing upon the diversity of religious beliefs in American society,
Justice Scalia argues that
we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.
See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98
H v. L. REv. 885 (1985).
89 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
90 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
87

88
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applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct
that does not protect an interest of the highest order. The rule
respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally
required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost
every conceivable kind ....91
The Supreme Court conceptualizes religion as primarily belief
with incidental ritualistic and conduct elements.92 Justice Scalia describes the exercise of religion as "often involv[ing] not only belief and
profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts:
assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain
foods or certain modes of transportation,"9 3 as if these performance
elements could be eliminated without doing major damage to the religious system with which they are associated. On the other hand, those
who have seriously studied religious systems come to very different
conclusions.
Lawson and McCauley argue that
neither texts nor traditions . . .are necessary features of religious systems .... The insistence in the study of religion that
texts and traditions are critical features of full-fledged religions
has always served as a strategy for insulating the "great" world
religions generally and Christianity in particular from the sort of
analyses otherwise reserved for "primitives"-which is to say, all
94
the rest of humanity.
In Lawson and McCauley's view, a "religious system" is "a symboliccultural system of ritual acts accompanied by an extensive and largely
shared conceptual scheme that includes culturally postulated superhuman agents."95 Symbolic-cultural systems serve to organize the behavior of individuals and groups.9 6 According to Lawson and
McCauley, it is socio-cultural systems which do not involve a commitment to superhuman agents that are extremely unlikely to have highly
developed ritual systems. 97 Thus, it is ultimately the Jeffersonian rationalist Deist position that leads to the conclusion that ritual is an
unimportant "luxury" that can be treated as merely an appendage to
religious belief.
91 Id. at" 888.
92 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's FreeExerciseJurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failureto Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIo
ST. L.J. 713 (1993).
93 Id. at 877.
94 LAWSON & MCCAULEY,
95 Id. at 5.
96 Id. at 2.
97 Id. at 7-8.

supra note 19, at 5-6.
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Rituals have communicative functions.9" Justice Jackson understood this clearly in his discussion of the compulsory flag salute:
Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating
ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system,
idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to
mind. Causes and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag
or banner, a color or design. The State announces rank, function, and authority through crowns and maces, uniforms and
black robes; the church speaks through the Cross, the Crucifix,
the altar and shrine, and clerical raiment. Symbols of State
often convey political ideas just as religious symbols come to
convey theological ones. Associated with many of these symbols
are appropriate gestures of acceptance99 or respect: a salute, a
bowed or bared head, a bended knee.
Rituals also have an additional function of representing values
and reinforcing commitments to them.100 Again the Supreme Court
has recognized this in articulating the value of uniform dress in the
military services: "the traditional outfitting of personnel in standardized uniforms encourages the subordination of personal preferences
and identities in favor of the overall group mission. Uniforms encourage a sense of hierarchical unity by tending to eliminate outward
individual distinctions except for those of rank." 10 1
While the Supreme Court has had little trouble recognizing the
important role played by secular rituals such as flags and uniforms, it
has rarely been willing to take as seriously the role of ritual in religion.
While in a case like Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye v. City of Hialeah °2
the Supreme Court discusses the background of animal sacrifice in
the Santeria faith, one senses a bit of incredulity in the Court's discussion. Indeed, the Court felt compelled to point out that animal sacrifice had a role in ancient Judaism and is still practiced annually in
modern Islam. Thus it attempts to legitimize the practice by pointing
to more mainstream groups that have historically or in contemporary
times accepted it. The Court does not appear capable of understanding any role for animal sacrifice at a level which it can treat as intellectually respectable, even though it can find respectable justifications
for flag salutes and military uniforms.
Theologians who take religious practice more seriously can presId. at 33-37.
99 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
100 LAWSON & MCCAULEY, supra note 19, at 38-40.
101 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986).
102 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
98
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ent a different picture. For example, Richard L. Rubenstein, a postHolocaust philosopher, makes a compelling argument relating to
animal sacrifice in his essay Atonement and Sacrifice in ContemporaryJewish Liturgy.1" 3 In his view, animal sacrifice is a "nonverbal teacher of
the limits of human moral possibilities. "104 For Rubenstein, the Holocaust called into question the idea of moral progress. Animal sacrifice
is a method of controlling or channeling destructive, but ineradicable,
elements of human nature. The communal hunger for a scapegoat at
times of great stress is satisfied with animals, so that the community is
prevented from expressing itself through the kind of mass murder exemplified by Auschwitz.' 0 5
The point of this all is that ritual is neither trivial nor irrelevant.
Nor is it tangential to religious systems. Rather, ritual is often central
to the ability of religious systems to transmit values and apply those
values to control the conduct of adherents. If the Constitution protects religious communities not as anachronistic curiosities, but as important components in creating standards of belief and behavior in
modern societies, the Court must take more seriously the importance
of religious ritual practices.
V.

GETTING IT RIGHT:

BACK TO THE FUTURE

After the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Smith, debate over
free exercise doctrine focused upon whether the "compelling interest" test should be used when neutral statutes of general applicability were challenged. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 restored the compelling interest standard legislatively.10 6
That statute provides:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability .

.

. [unless] it demonstrates that application of the

burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
103 RIcHARD

L.

RUBENSTEIN, AFTER

RARYJuDAISM 92-111
104 Id. at 98.

AuscHwrrz:

RADICAL THEOLOGY AND CONTEMPO-

(1966).

Id. at 100, 104-08.
106 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). For discussion of the constitutional105

ity of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's attempt to restore the compelling interest test, see Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, S. REP. No. 111,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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(2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compel10 7
ling governmental interest.
In restoring the compelling interest test, the text of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act specifically refers to the formulation of the
test in two prior Supreme Court cases,1" 8 Sherbert v. Verner °9 and Wisconsin v. Yodr 11 In light of the analysis of free exercise that I have
presented, I would suggest that despite their facial similarities, the approach of Yoder was in fact very different than the approach of Sherbert,
and that only Yoder was correct in its analysis.
Yoder was perhaps an example of an easy case making good law,
for in the case of the Amish, the importance of maintaining the integrity of a religious subgroup was easily pointed out to the Court. Chief
Justice Burger portrayed the Amish community and their religious
practices sympathetically and with respect. The intense separateness
of the Amish community made it clear to the Court that applying the
compulsory school attendance law to Amish children beyond the
eighth grade created "a very real threat of undermining the Amish
community and religious practice as they exist today." 'l The argument that the compulsory school attendance law regulated conduct
rather than belief, and thus was less easily challenged, was rejected
rather summarily by the Court through the statement that "in this
context belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments."1 12 As the Court phrased it, "the Amish mode of life and
107 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 9, 107 Stat.
1488 (1993), to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
108 Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b)(1), 107 Stat. 1499 (1993), to be codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b) (1) (describing one of the act's purposes as being "to restore
the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner ... and Wisconsin v.
Yoder... and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened"). However, the Committee Reports accompanying the legislation make it clear that Congress intended to restore the compelling interest test as
applied in a variety of cases prior to Smithz
The committee wishes to stress that the act does not express approval or
disapproval of the result reached in any particular court decision involving the free exercise of religion, including those cited in the act itself.
This bill is not a codification of the result reached in any prior free
exercise decision but rather the restoration of the legal standard that
was applied in those decisions. Therefore, the compelling interest test
generally should not be construed more stringently or more leniently
than it was prior to Smith.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1993). Similar language appears in the House Report, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
109 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
110 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
111 Id. at 218.
112 Id. at 220.
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education is inseparable from and a part of the basic tenets of their
religion-indeed as much a part of their religious belief and practices
1 13
as baptism, the confessional, or a sabbath may be for others."
That, of course, is the point with all religiously motivated conduct. In Reynolds v. United States, the Court pointed out that the Mormon Church taught that the duty of male members to practice
polygamy was divine in origin and that the failure or refusal of Mormon men to practice polygamy when circumstances permitted would
be punished by damnation in the life to come.1 14 The Reynolds Court,
of course, essentially responded that it is perfectly fine to believe this
so long as you do not act upon your beliefs. A comparable statement
to parents of Amish children in Yoder was unthinkable to the Court.
Beyond this rejection of the belief-action distinction, Yoder is
more remarkable for its intuitive understanding of the role of religious subgroups in American society. The Court made it clear that
the Amish maintained a separate value system and system of social
controls on its members. It recognized that the Amish educational
system of formalized schooling through the eighth grade, followed by
informal vocational training, was a substitute for the state's more general rule of formal education through age sixteen. As the Court
concluded:
It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two
beyond the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the
preparation of the child for life in modern society as the majority live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed
as the preparation of the child for life in the separated agrarian
community that is the keystone of the Amish faith.1 1 5
Thus, the Court recognized that a background system of civil rules
may legitimately operate only for those who are not subject to the
strictures of a different religio-legal system that more effectively structures their lives and their human interrelationships. Subgroup autonomy within a broader background legal system, which in essence
provides a default rule only for the unaffiliated, may strengthen,
rather than weaken the society. Chief Justice Burger pointed out:
"We must not forget that in the Middle Ages important values of the
civilization of the Western World were preserved by members of religious orders who isolated themselves from all worldly influences
16
against great obstacles."
113

Id. at 219.
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98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878).
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222.
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At the same time, the Yoder Court recognized the importance of
the principle which we have discussed earlier, namely that an individual should be able to terminate both membership in and loyalty to a
specific subgroup in favor of another group, or in favor of residual
membership in the general civil religion of the broad society.1 17 The
state of Wisconsin had strongly urged application of the broad compulsory school attendance law to Amish children because some children will choose to leave their Amish community and they must be
trained to function in the broader secular world. In response, the
Court pointed out that "[t]here is nothing in this record to suggest
that the Amish qualities of reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to
work would fail to find ready markets in today's society." 1 '
While Sherbert v. Verner' 19 superficially appeared to apply a compelling interest test similar to the one applied in Yoder, the Court's
underlying approach was in fact very different. Adell Sherbert was denied unemployment compensation benefits by the state of South Carolina on the basis that she would not be available for a new job when it
was offered to her. This finding was based upon the fact that as a
member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, Ms. Sherbert refused
to work on Saturday. The Court held that a denial of benefits for this
reason violated Sherbert's First Amendment free exercise rights.
The difference in the Court's approach in Sherbert was its emphasis upon the personal interests of Adell Sherbert, and its lack of emphasis on the interest of the Seventh Day Adventist Church in
maintaining its autonomy. The Court focused almost entirely upon
the pressure placed upon Ms. Sherbert by the state of South Carolina
to give up her religious practices. In the Court's view, the economic
effect of the state's position was equivalent to imposing a fine on Ms.
Sherbert for worshipping on Saturday.' 2 0 As a practical, and probably
a legal matter, the Court pointed out that those who observed their
sabbath on Sunday were not faced with the choice imposed on Ms.
Sherbert. 121

What was really at issue in Sherbert was whether the state should
tolerate a subgroup which, for those within its religio-legal jurisdiction, replaced the then-prevailing civil rule of Sunday as a day of rest
with an alternative. In fact, the Court had come closer to focusing on
that question-and reached an opposite result-two years earlier in
117
118

See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
406 U.S. at 224.

119 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
120

Id. at 404.

121

Id. at 406.
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Braunfeld v. Brown,1 22 where OrthodoxJewish merchants, who for religious reasons closed their businesses on Saturday, challenged the
state's requirement that they also close on Sunday. While recognizing
that the Sunday-closing law imposed a financial burden on Sabbatarians, the Court nevertheless refused to carve out an exception for
those who also kept their places of business closed on Saturday. Any
other result, the Court said, when the challenged legislation did not
impose direct criminal penalties on the practice of religion, "would
123
radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature."
Sherbert was able to uphold an individual's free exercise claim by
avoiding a focus upon the true issue-the extent to which society
should permit a religious group to establish an alternative set of behavioral standards for its members. Sherbert's focus on individual
rather than group concerns permitted Justice Scalia in Smith to distinguish it and other free exercise challenges in the unemployment compensation area as cases which lent themselves to individualized
exemptions based on the reason for the individual's conduct.'1 4 To
the extent that the real question was the viability of a religious group
whose tenets deviated from the societal default rule regarding Sunday
as the day of rest, Sherbert must be seen, as Justice
Stewart argued in his
5
concurrence, as having overruled Braunfeld.1
VI.

CONCLUSION

The compelling interest test is workable only if the Court has
some notion of what makes one governmental pronouncement
more compelling than another. Given the strong interest of government in maintaining the viability of intermediate associations in
order to strengthen the general social fabric, the government's interest should be deemed compelling only when it is aimed at
preventing intermediate associations of a religious nature from undermining the background civil religion, when it is aimed at
preventing undue political fragmentation along religious lines, or
when it is aimed at preventing religious groups from locking in
adherents and preventing their exit or their transfer of loyalty to
competing groups. This understanding of the free exercise guarantee will require a shift of focus. Perhaps even more significantly
it will require a change of attitude. This approach requires reli122 366 U.S. 599 (1961).

123 Id. at 606.
124 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Services v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-83
(1990).
125 374 U.S. 398, 418 (1963) (StewartJ,

concurring).
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gious groups to be taken seriously as a force in modern social ordering rather than being treated as enshrined anachronistic
curiosities of our legal system.

